I. Introduction
Operating behind the scenes of online commerce; parity clauses, also known as 'mostfavoured-nation clauses ' (MFNs) 1 have played an increasingly significant role in the relationship between price comparison websites (PCWs) and their suppliers. These clauses, which have become a common feature in recent years, aim to provide assurance to the downstream online platform that it has received goods or services from the supplier, at terms that are at least as favourable as those offered to any other buyers. The rationale behind such restriction lies in the vertical relationship between the PCW and the supplier. It is designed to resolve the hold-up problem, often manifested in vertical relationships, by removing the risk * Slaughter and May Professor of Competition Law, The University of Oxford. Director, Oxford Centre for Competition Law and Policy. The research, on which this paper is based, was financially supported by Slaughter and May, which acts for Booking.com. The usual disclaimer applies -the views expressed in this paper and any errors or omissions are the authors' own. 1 Also known as 'Most-Favoured-Customer clauses' and, more generally, 'price relationship agreements' (PRAs).
of the supplier, or other sellers, free riding on the PCWs' investment in promoting the supplier's products and services.
MFNs are commonly divided into two distinct categories: narrow and wide, differentiated by their scope and effects.
A narrow MFN clause links the price and terms quoted on an online platform, to those available directly on the upstream supplier's website, ensuring that the former will not be less attractive than the latter.
A wide MFN clause provides for similar protection on a wider scale, aiming to ensure that the price and terms quoted through the platform in question will not be higher than the price available directly on the upstream supplier's website or on any other platform.
In addition to the narrow/wide classification, MFNs may also be categorised by the distribution model that they support.
In a wholesale model, the agreement governs the price at which the upstream supplier will sell to the online platform, but does not determine the final price available on the platform. In such instances, the MFN helps to ensure the platform's competitive cost structure.
2 Under an agency model, the upstream supplier sets the final price on the platform, and the platform receives a commission for each sale made under an agreed revenue-sharing clause.
In these cases, the platform does not purchase the product but rather acts as an agent, selling it on behalf of the supplier. The MFN does not affect the platform's cost structure but ensures that products or services sold through it will be priced competitively.
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Other distribution models may include a combination of both wholesale and agency elements. includes a fixed mark-up. Under such model the upstream supplier determines the wholesale price, while the contract between the parties includes an agreed margin for the retailer. 4 The scope and nature of parity clauses have been the subject of increased scrutiny in recent years, as competition agencies grapple with the task of identifying the dividing line between their possible pro-and anti-competitive effects. The task is not an easy one, as MFNs may generate a mixture of effects, which vary depending on the scope of the clause, the nature of distribution and the characteristics of the relevant market.
This article explores the welfare effects generated by price parity clauses between price comparison websites (PCWs) and their suppliers. The paper focuses on the use of MFNs in an agency model setting, which (together with the merchant model) is the most common business model utilised by suppliers and PCWs worldwide. It explores the differences between narrow and wide parity clauses -the dissimilar competitive effects they generate and subsequently the divergent enforcement approach they call for.
The discussion begins by considering the economic rationale for price parity clauses and the welfare benefits they may generate. It then contrasts these benefits with the welfare harm that parity clauses may trigger. The analysis distinguishes between the different pro-and anticompetitive effects generated by wide and narrow MFNs. Cases discussed include the high profile Apple eBook investigation, Amazon, the HRS decision and the more recent Booking.com commitments. The paper concludes with reflections on the legality of MFN clauses and the level of competition intervention to which they ought to be subjected.
II. The Economic Rationale
The environment in which MFNs are typically present consists of an upstream supplier that uses a downstream online platform, such as a PCW, to sell its products. The supplier may use the online platform as its sole channel, or in addition to selling goods through other means (whether offline or online). The online platform, on its part, invests in demand-enhancing features, which may include additional services such as marketing, advertising, after sale support, advice and guarantees. These efforts promote the supplier's product and its brand. In addition they position the online platform as an attractive sales channel. The MFN clause provides parity provisions which limit the freedom of the upstream supplier when offering its product through other sale channels.
As noted above, the typical model used by many suppliers and online platforms is the agency model, under which the downstream platform provides customers with demand-enhancing features and receives a commission from the upstream supplier for every sale it facilitates. It is important to note the difference between the business model used by PCWs which is at the centre of this paper, and the business model used by online (meta) search engines. The former rely on an agency model and commission per sale to reward them for their demand enhancing investments. The latter generate their income from advertising and successful referrals to the supplier or PCW. Contrary to PCWs, the search engines are generally remunerated based on the number of clicks which lead to the advertisers' website, irrespective of whether a sale subsequently took place.
Externalities
As is the case in many vertical settings, one of the main barriers to a company's successful operation in the downstream market is the risk of free-riding. 5 One often identifies a vertical externality between the upstream supplier and the downstream retailer, which undermines the retailer's incentive to invest. In an online environment, such an externality may arise when the supplier is able to undercut its price or terms of sales through the PCW, thereby incentivising consumers to use the PCW for search, information and other services while subsequently concluding the transaction via the upstream supplier.
In addition, when several PCWs operate downstream, a horizontal externality may emerge, since online platforms may free-ride on one another's investment in promotion and demandenhancing features. This externality may again dis-incentivise an online platform from investing in features which do not tie the user to the platform, such as providing customer discounted rate), maps, and other information. 6 These effects subsequently undermine the PCWs' incentive to promote and advertise its suppliers' services and products online.
These externalities are particularly noticeable when considering the operation of PCWs in the modern online environment. Users gain information not only through these platforms but also through (meta) search engines, through which they can identify and compare the best price, service and terms, and selectively engage with each of the providers.
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The role played by parity clauses Parity clauses are often introduced into the vertical relationship in order to minimise externalities and facilitate investment. Consider, for instance, a narrow MFN clause in which the supplier agrees not to offer the goods on its own website at a lower price or on better terms. This protection incentivises the PCW to invest in demand enhancing features, creating an accessible platform through which search costs are minimised and consumers can compare price and other non-price indicators (such as customer ratings, service and quality). Absent adequate safeguards, customers may use the PCWs to learn about the product or its characteristics, yet subsequently complete the transaction directly on the supplier's web-site or through other channels. Such externality would undermine investment and efficiency downstream -as the PCW will not see a return on its investment.
In addition to its role in resolving the hold-up problem, parity supports risk-sharing between upstream and downstream operators. The size of the investment by the PCW depends upon both the breadth of the protection afforded to the downstream platform, and the level of horizontal competition to which the PCW is exposed. Other benefits and efficiencies associated with MFNs include their role in preventing delays in transacting -removing uncertainty as to the availability of better alternative bargains -and in reducing transaction costs by avoiding the need for a constant negotiation of terms between the contracting parties. Later in the paper we explore in greater detail the adequate balance between the protection afforded by MFNs and the need to facilitate and secure investment and innovation. At this stage, it is sufficient to note that absent such protection -narrow or wide -the risk of being undercut by rivals or suppliers could lead to a hold-up-problem and would likely stifle investment downstream. 9 The short term gain which the supplier or competitor obtains when free riding, would ultimately result in long term inefficiency, absorbed by the market as a whole. 10 Failure to address this problem may undermine PCWs and consequently inhibit their contribution to information flow, access and competitive market dynamics.
The beneficial effects of PCWs
The presence of an intermediary -the PCW -provides a range of distinct benefits to customers and to competitive dynamics.
The presence of a web aggregator often improves information flows by collating and aggregating quantitative and qualitative data about suppliers, price and product characteristics. Such data is often provided in multiple languages, supporting access to retailers and distributors worldwide. Further, as modern markets are often characterised by differentiated products and services, the availability of an aggregated information hub is of central significance; it makes it easier for users to compare offerings and identify the best bargain. This promotes competition on price and quality between suppliers, as they strive to increase sales. Importantly, the presence of PCWs makes it harder for suppliers to take advantage of ill-informed customers who are subjected to high information costs. Commission which identified a deficiency in the availability of relevant information, which undermined the competitive process.
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When the web-aggregator provides comparison tools and reviews, it may also diffuse attempts by distributors to 'overcomplicate' their offering in order to increase information costs. Improvements to, and the simplification of, information flow about differentiated products also reduces switching costs, thereby increasing the mobility of customers, enhancing competition between suppliers and creating further downward pressure on price.
In addition to 'customer related benefits', PCWs also provide a range of distinct benefits to the upstream suppliers which use their services.
First and foremost, PCWs serve a crucial function of risk and cost mitigation. This is of particular significance for suppliers who would otherwise be exposed to excessive risk and costs associated with online advertising and commerce. For instance, these suppliers may lack the economies of scale to achieve a high conversion rate and return on investment in online advertising.
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They may also lack the requisite sophistication needed for cost effective bidding on keywords which are central for search marketing. 19 When a hotel invests in pay-per-click advertising, it will only achieve conversion if the customer is interested in that hotel. On the other hand, an OTA is likely to achieve higher conversion rates as it represents a large number of hotels. Its investment in advertising is therefore less risky and more likely to be recouped.
The hotel industry provides an illustrative example of such function. PCWs engage in sophisticates and ongoing bidding for 'search words' on search engines as part of their demand enhancing services for suppliers. As an intermediary, representing a large number of hotels, they are able to obtain higher conversion rates -that is, the ability to turn visitors into customers. This function has significant effects on small and medium sized hotels as they would otherwise find it too costly and risky to engage in direct advertising and absorb the high cost of pay-per-click advertising. Search engines would require the hotels to pay for any click on the advertisement, regardless of whether a transaction followed. With the low conversion rates -that is, the ability to turn visitors into customers -a payment for every click may prove uneconomical. To better appreciate the costs involved, note for instance the cost of search terms such as 'Hotel Paris' which may go up to EUR 25 per click, regardless of whether that click led to a subsequent sale. Absent the presence of an intermediary, some suppliers may have limited or no 'search marketing' -thus limiting the availability of information from which customers may benefit.
In contrast, by acting as an intermediary which is able to invest in large scale advertising, the PCW facilitates cost-based efficiencies and mitigates the risks to which suppliers are exposed, as they only pay a commission for a successful transaction. 20 Absent this function, small and medium entities would have played a more limited role in the competitive process, leaving the centre stage for the larger entities which are better placed to absorb the costs and risks and would benefit from a higher conversion rate.
In addition to their role in reducing suppliers' costs and risks, PCWs also provide a safe environment in which customers may conclude the deal. For instance, a web-aggregator's payment system, guarantee and ease of transaction may prove crucial for new, unknown entrants. Customers who would otherwise be apprehensive about a new entrant or small supplier, may be more willing to engage in a transaction when the web-aggregator offers its own payment system and guarantees.
PCWs also help reduce transaction delays by preventing consumers from delaying their purchases in the hope of a better deal. 21 The incentive for consumers to stall their purchases is reduced if all major suppliers sell through a single web-aggregator. The range of suppliers and products searchable on these platforms often reveals unknown sellers and products to which customers would not otherwise have been exposed. The facilitation of entry further enhances competitive pressure upstream, to the benefit of consumers.
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Overall, PCWs facilitate sales, economies of scale and efficiencies in distribution, marketing and promotion. They do so at both national and international levels, thus widening the reach of suppliers and widening the customer base. As these supplier-focused efficiencies lower costs and risks for suppliers, they enable them to offer lower prices to the benefit of customers.
III. Wide Parity -All that Glitters is not Gold
As illustrated above, PCWs enable a competitive market dynamic and can contribute to consumer welfare, with MFNs being instrumental to their operation. Yet, the restrictions afforded by MFN's may also undermine potential positive welfare gains, and therefore they require careful review and balancing.
Evidently, the welfare effects of a parity clause depends upon its scope, application, the level of competition at different levels of the distribution chain, and the market environment. 
Excessive intermediation
While PCWs increase transparency and therefore competition among suppliers, that competition may not always lead to lower prices. Excessive intermediation may occur when the PCW operates under an agency/merchant model, charging a fee for each transaction, and a wide MFN clause is in place. In such a scenario, the downstream PCW may be incentivised to increase its fees or be dis-incentivised from reducing them. This could be the case when the wide MFN protects the PCW from the risk that a supplier will react to an increase in the commission it has to pay, by increasing the product price on that platform only (which would, of course, make the price offered on that platform less attractive in comparison to the price offered on other PCWs). As a result, one may witness a softening of competition between online platforms regarding the charges they levy on their suppliers. 27 As noted by Edelman and Wright:
… the increase in retail prices all buyers face as a result of intermediation cancels out the extra benefits they obtain [from that intermediation]… Buyers participate, even though they are jointly worse off from doing so, due to a coordination failure… If buyers could coordinate, they would take into account the higher price that results from their individual decisions to join the intermediary, and collectively they would prefer not to join the intermediary.
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Moreover, competition between online platforms, would not necessarily reduce excessive intermediation:
First, when [an] intermediary… charges sellers higher fees than are charged by competing intermediaries, price coherence ensures that the buyers that choose rival intermediaries share those higher fees… Second, with price coherence, an intermediary does not face a reduction in demand as it raises its fees to sellers… Third, by raising its fees to sellers and raising the benefits it offers buyers, an intermediary attracts buyers away from other intermediaries with lower benefits-even though those intermediaries have lower fees to sellers.
As a result, excessive fees and benefits persist in equilibrium, and too many buyers join intermediaries.
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The UK Competition and Markets Authority observed these welfare effects in its review of the private motor insurance sector:
Generally, we expected that higher commission fees would lead to higher policy premiums because there was likely to be some pass-through of costs to premiums... irrespective of the rate of pass-through, the PCW with the wide MFN could continue to increase commission fees until the price of the policy was too high from the point of view of the PCW. Premiums across the market might increase up to the point at which [private motor insurance] providers exercised their 'outside option', which would be to withdraw from listing on the PCW with the wide MFN and to seek to attract customers from other sources… 30
Indeed, excessive intermediation -that is, higher commission -is less likely to occur, even under wide MFN, when viable outside options are available, when the supplier benefits from buyer power, when de-listing becomes a viable option for a supplier, or when a risk of significant new PCW entry is likely.
When an increase in commission does persist, that increase could be reflected in a price increase by the supplier. Note that the supplier is likely to resist an increase in the price, in order to retain its competitive position against other brands. Accordingly, it may prefer to absorb the increase in the charge. However, if the increase in commission is too high, the supplier is likely to terminate the relationship with the MFN or increase the price across the board -since, under the wide MFN, price parity with other platforms is guaranteed.
Limits on low cost entry to the downstream market
A second theory of harm associated with wide MFNs concerns the possibility that the presence of wide parity clauses, combined with an agency model, would hinder entry by PCWs into the downstream market.
This may be the case when a new platform wishes to adopt a low cost model, yet is unable to secure lower prices from distributors under an existing wide parity agency model. As the supplier is obliged to offer the incumbent PCWs any price it offers on the entrant's platform, successful. Further, it will provide an entrant with some assurance that following its investment, it will not be undercut by other PCWs or be subjected to free riding.
Price uniformity
Another possible effect often linked to wide MFNs is the increased likelihood of industrywide price uniformity. After all, under an agency model, the imposition of wide MFNs by leading platforms would result in identical pricing and terms. The supplier lacks any incentive to reduce its price on other platforms, because this would result in an across-theboard reduction to all online platforms that benefit from a wide MFN.
The actual effects of price uniformity depend, among other things, upon the number and size of PCWs that benefit from wide MFNs, the number of suppliers tied to such agreements, the bargaining powers of suppliers and PCWs, (timely) compliance by supplier with MFN and the availability of meta-search tools. Importantly, the possible effects of price uniformity depend on the level of inter-brand competition. Limits to intra-brand competition are likely to have limited effects when inter-brand competition is present. When competition between different suppliers exists, the supplier will be incentivised to lower the retail price it sets, in order to ensure its viability. In such cases, uniformed prices even when present, are likely to be competitive. 
Limits on innovation and investment
While parity clauses are aimed at minimising externalities and increasing investment and innovation downstream, wide parity clauses may theoretically have the potential to limit such investments. Admittedly, this theory of harm is the weakest of all four. It suggests that under wide parity, the incentive to invest is dampened, as investment will not result in lower retail prices and will fail to attract more customers to the PCWs. According to this theory of harm, absent wide MFNs, a downstream web-aggregator may be incentivised to invest in demandenhancing features and other efficient measures which would increase its appeal to upstream suppliers.
The difficulty with this theory of harm is that it ignores other parameters of competition.
Indeed, even when price is set by the supplier, PCWs are likely to compete on quality and service. In fact, the parity clause provides them with some protection against free riding, thus further facilitating innovation and investment in demand enhancing features -offering information in multiple languages, reviews, call centres, advertising services etc.
Where this theory of harm could play a role, is in instances in which a given investment would benefit the upstream supplier but would have no beneficial effect on the PCWs or its The most publicised case which involved wide MFNs, and was pursued on both sides of the Atlantic, concerned Apple's use of wide parity in its iBooks Store. Importantly, while of high profile, the case did not address the competitive effects of wide MFNs as such, but focused on Apple's attempt to affect eBook prices. Nonetheless, the case provides an interesting starting point:
In the U.S., the Department of Justice raised concerns regarding the wide MFN clauses and agency models used in agreements between Apple Inc. and leading publishers. 36 changing to the agency model or otherwise face the risk of being denied access to the e-books of each of the Five Publishers.
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The Commission accepted commitments offered by Apple and the publishers, which included the termination of the agency agreements, a two year ban on the publishers' ability to obstruct e-book retailers from setting their own prices or offering discounts, and a five year ban on MFN clauses.
42
Moving to cases where wide parity was addressed directly, notable is Amazon's use of wide MFNs in its agreements with suppliers. In 2013, the UK Office of Fair Trading (OFT) and the German Bundeskartellamt challenged the use of these provisions. The arrangements in question established a wide prohibition, restricting suppliers' freedom to offer their products at a lower price through competing platforms to Amazon's own. These arrangements extended beyond price and included shipping, discounts and customer service policies.
Concerns raised by the agencies included the upward pressure these clauses may have on online platform fees and prices, and the negative effect they may have on potential entrants.
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In response to these concerns, Amazon ended its price parity policy across its EU Marketplace. 44 In 2015 Amazon's use of MFN came again under scrutiny when the European Commission opened a formal investigation into Amazon's e-book distribution arrangements.
Among other things, the Commission considered the use of wide-MFNs which grant Amazon the right to terms and conditions at least as good as those offered to its competitors, and 'seem to shield Amazon from competition from other e-book distributors'. In 2013, the Bundeskartellamt reached a decision concerning the use of broad parity clauses by the OTA -HRS. 47 The broad parity clauses in question required hotel partners to guarantee that the price offered on HRS was no greater than the cheapest rate offered by or for the hotel on other online booking and travel platforms, or on the hotel's own web pages and offline sale channels. 48 The MFNs covered parity not only in price, but also in room availability, booking conditions and mobile applications. 49 The Bundeskartellamt noted that HRS had strictly monitored hotels' adherence to the terms of these clauses and threatened to terminate contractual relations with hotels that failed to apply the parity. It subsequently held that the wide MFN clauses at issue were set to directly restrict the price setting freedom of hotels on the other sales channels. 50 It found that the wide MFNs removed the economic incentive for the OTA to lower commissions to the hotels or to adopt new sales strategies. In January 2015, the Düsseldorf Higher Regional Court upheld the Bundeskartellamt decision and condemned the restrictive effect that a parity clause has had on the hotel companies' freedom to act. 54 Interestingly, the court also raised doubts regarding HRS' claim that wide MFNs created crucial incentives for ongoing investment in the quality of the downstream platform. It opined that investment would not necessarily be undermined, even if the removal of MFNs and consequent free-rider problems reduced sales downstream. In such a case, the Court noted, it would be in the PCW's commercial interest to improve its market position through investment in quality, special offers and promotional activities:
The more users a platform attracts, on both the supply side and the demand side, the more appealing it becomes for new users in turn. Even without restricting price differentiation by the hotels, therefore, there is a considerable incentive for [the OTA] to invest in the quality of the portal's offering.
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While the Court's condemnation of the wide parity is convincing, its overreaching statement, which ignores the risk of free ridding, is intriguing. Is it truly the case that a downstream operator will continue to invest despite externalities and reduced conversion rates? After all, if suppliers are given a free reign to undercut the price they themselves have set on the PCW, why would the downstream PCW continue to invest in promoting their business? No doubt, free riding will pose a dilemma for the PCW as it will have to continue investing is services to maintain traffic and a user-friendly interface. Yet, overtime, it seems reasonable to expect that under the existing agency model, such free riding would undermine the PCW's profitability and subsequently its investment downstream.
Another noteworthy case in the hotel industry concerned the online travel agent Overall, the discussion of wide MFNs reveals a large degree of consensus as to the likely harmful effects they generate, and has led competition agencies to condemn such practices. It is worth noting that such condemnation was not the result of an assumed illegality, but has 57 Also worthy of note is the Bundeskartellamt inquiry into energy-comparison portals and concerns raised as to the use of wide parity between Vrivox, a German electricity and gas web-aggregator, and its suppliers. been the result of case-by-case analysis, which took into account the market and contract characteristics, and subsequently appraised the likely effect on competition and consumer welfare.
V. Narrow Parity -The Competitive Effects
In contrast to wide MFNs, narrow MFNs constitute a less intrusive restriction on pricing or terms. Such arrangements are often limited to creating a link between the online price and terms available on the supplier's website, on the one hand, and on the PCW on the other.
These parity clauses may, at times, also include reference to the supplier's offline price. At other times they may be restricted in their scope, for instance, when they are dis-applied to groups of customers to which the supplier may offer better prices or terms.
Importantly, narrow MFNs are distinguishable from wide MFNs in that they only concern the relationship between a single web-aggregator and a single supplier, and do not govern the relationship between that supplier and other PCWs. As such, they may be regarded as establishing only a single linear link, as opposed to the multi-vector-net fostered by wide
MFNs.
This difference results in fundamental variations in effects between wide and narrow parity. Narrow partity, based on a single linear link, does not give rise to many of the concerns linked to wide parity multi-vector-net.
First and foremost, under the limited protection offered by narrow MFNs, the web-aggregator has no guarantee that an increase in its commission would not result in a competitive disadvantage. On the contrary, each web-aggregator is incentivised to offer more competitive terms in its negotiations with suppliers. After all, under an agency model, a lower commission will incentivise suppliers to lower their prices on that PCW. Since under narrow parity, the supplier is not required to match its best price and offer it elsewhere -lower prices can be offered in exchange for lower commission. This benefits both the supplier and the PCW, as it increases the volume of business through the platform.
Further, this competitive dynamic enhances competition between PCWs downstream -each competing to provide better demand-enhancing features and lower commissions. Similarly, it enhances intra-brand competition upstream, as suppliers are able to offer lower prices on different platforms. Similarly, inter-brand competition is intensified.
In addition, a removal and absence of availability parity (with other PCWs) gives the supplier the power and tools to effectively yield and differentiate prices across multiple platforms and/or lower commission.
Importantly, the narrow parity and absence of availability parity which make these competitive effects possible, is not likely to undermine investment downstream. PCWs still retain protection against direct free-riding by their supplier and are thus incentivised to offer demand-enhancing features. Further, as they compete horizontally against other PCWs, they are incentivised to improve the scope and quality of their services.
These positive effects should be considered in conjunction with two theories of harm which are associated with narrow parity. Although narrow in scope, these theories should be acknowledged:
Network effects and competition on commissions
The first theory of harm concerns the possible horizontal effects which may be present when the amalgamation of several single linear links generate a network effect. According to this theory of harm, the contractual freedom of upstream suppliers to offer different prices and terms on various PCWs, will not foster price competition between those PCWs. That may be the case, in particular, when: [1] an important proportion of sales are made through the supplier's own website; and [2] a number of narrow MFNs are in place between the supplier and the online platforms -each linking the price offered on a PCW to the supplier's price.
Consider the following scenario: A supplier is using several PCWs with narrow parity conditions. To limit the instances in which it is required to pay a commission to the PCWs, the supplier is keen to attract customers directly to its own website. To do so, the price on its website cannot be higher than that on PCWs. As a result, through a 'hub-and-spoke' effect, a de-facto floor price may be established for the given service or product.
Further, this combined network effect may discourage reduction in commission or lowcommission-fee entry. This is because any commission increase which results in a price increase, would also raise the upstream sale price on the supplier's website. When the supplier in keen to maintain the attractiveness of its own direct sale channel in comparison to other PCWs, it will consequently increase the price charged on other sales channels, even if they did not increase their commission level.
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The reason this theory of harm is limited in its application, is that it is likely to apply where the supplier runs a significant volume of sales through its own upstream website; a sales channel which it is keen to protect; and the level of inter-brand competition which the supplier faces, affecting the supplier's ability or incentive to decrease its product prices, is relatively low, enabling it to charge higher prices.
Absent these conditions, network effects are unlikely to materialise under narrow MFNs.
Therefore the practical manifestation of such effect is likely to be limited. Note for instance the UK Competition and Markets Authority's investigation into the Private Motor Insurance Market Investigation. The CMA noted that when a direct channel has been highly significant for the upstream supplier, that supplier would often not be listed on PCWs, making narrow MFN considerations irrelevant. 63 It therefore concluded that narrow MFNs were unlikely to have a network effect impacting on competition between PCWs.
Similarly, in the Booking.com investigation, the agencies considered the hotel's incentive to grant Online Travel Agents (OTAs) a lower room rates relative to that charged on the hotel's website or through other OTAs. They concluded that the removal of wide parity used by all
OTAs active on the market, the removal of availability parity and the use of narrow parity, would lead to a decrease in commission charged, a decrease in the rates for rooms and a shift to closed user group members' rates (CUG) which fall outside the scope of the narrow parity obligation. 64 This conclusion emerged from consideration of the market characteristics. For instance, the fact that hotels' websites provide only for a small proportion of online sales and obtain most online reservations through OTAs. Also the fact that OTAs provide cost effective 62 The CMA considered such a possibility in its Report on the Private Motor Insurance Market, Points 8. advertising and sale channels, which benefit hotels and reduce the cost risk to which they are subjected. 65 In addition, relevant was the availability of loyalty programmes as a distinct channel not covered by MFNs. Overall, in such a market reality, hotels may be incentivised to offer lower prices through OTAs and undercut their own website, thus eliminating risk of network effects or upward pressure on commissions.
It is worth noting that even when the market could give rise to network effects, they may nonetheless be countered by further narrowing of the parity clause. The agreement may, for instance, carve out certain groups of customers or offline sales. Such limitations would disrupt potential network effects and re-introduce horizontal price competition. Furthermore, the absence of availability parity does allow a supplier to directly sell its stock, or in the case of hotels to sell its "last room(s)".
Reduction in vertical competition
The second theory of harm concerns the reduction in vertical competition between the webaggregator and the upstream supplier. Recall that, under a narrow MFN clause, the upstream supplier cannot sell at better terms than are available downstream. This restriction may raise concern when it significantly reduces the competitive pressure that the supplier can apply on the downstream market, thus resulting in higher prices.
In its Private Motor Insurance Market Investigation, the CMA explored this theory of harm by measuring the constraint which PMI providers' websites placed on PCWs. The CMA found that 'in general, attracting customers through PCWs was cheaper for PMI providers than direct customer acquisition.' 66 This led the CMA to conclude that PCWs had had the overall effect of lowering costs for PMI providers.
The CMA further considered the price elasticity of demand exhibited through different sales channels. It found that customers' ability to 'compare directly the prices of different policies on PCWs was likely to be a major driver of inter-brand competition', adding that 'whilst narrow MFNs limited competition between the own website and the PCW, this was unlikely 65 Note for instance the costs associated with pay-per-click advertising and meta-search site costs and costs hotels may incur for direct customer acquisition. 66 Id, Point 8.56.
to have much of an impact on competition between brands.' 67 It concluded that the restriction on competition imposed by narrow MFNs was unlikely to be significant.
As illustrated above, in the Booking.com investigation narrow parity was likely to incentivise hotels to offer cheaper room rates through PCWs rather than on their website. As put by the Italian Competition Agency:
The projections made by the Authority in relation to Booking's simulation model prove this argument. They show that hotels usually have incentives to offer lower commissions in an OTA compared to those offered on their website.
68
Again, as with the first theory of harm, one should bear in mind that, even when an effects based analysis reveals harm, such harm may be addressed by a further narrowing of the MFN clause, carving out groups of customers or sale channels in order to stimulate competition.
VI. Narrow Parity -Enforcement Highlights
Overall, the more limited intrusion into the supplier's freedom to set its price and terms under narrow MFNs has been accepted in several jurisdictions as providing a satisfactory equilibrium, which promotes downstream investment in demand-enhancing features and information provisions without constituting too intrusive a restriction on competition. to determine the price offline and to offer discounts to select groups of customers (such as members of the hotel's loyalty scheme and former customers). In addition, hotels are no longer bound by availability parity, which previously limited their ability to offer more rooms through selected distribution channels. 71 The investigating agencies considered the narrowing of the parity clauses to provide a successful balancing formula sufficient to resolve their concerns. 72 The Swedish competition authority noted that the narrow MFN clause reduces the risk that hotels free-ride on investments made by Booking.com:
This in turn allows Booking.com to receive remuneration for its search and compare services so that the services can continue to be offered on the market to the benefit of consumers.'
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The results of the analyses carried out by the Competition Authority support the conclusion that hotels will have incentives to offer lower room prices in exchange for lower commission rates. An important motivation for the hotels in this context will be the competition between hotels for room bookings.
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Similarly, the French Competition Agency noted that:
The final commitments made by Booking.com… re-introduce competition between OTAs, address the risk of foreclosure of competing OTAs and notably new entry OTAs and enable to respond to competition concerns even though similar undertakings have to date not been taken by other OTAs. Furthermore, contrary to allegations of certain contributors to the market test, the 71 The NCAs concluded that relevant market is OTA only (therefore, OTAs are not competing with hotels and only form an alternative distribution channel that without availability parity obligation can be used and utilized at hotel discretion. OTAs' freedom to offer discounts off the published room rate, to a defined group of customers, up to the level of commission charged by the OTAs. According to the commitment, the discounts offered by the OTAs will not be publicly available outside the defined customer group. 73 Point 30, unofficial translation, The Swedish Competition Authority commitment decision, Bookingdotcom Sverige AB and Booking.com, 15 April 2015, Ref: 596/2013. 74 Id, Point 46, unofficial translation. commitment relating to the partial removal of the price parity provision is not tantamount to maintaining wide de facto price parity provision.
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The agency held that, as Booking.com eliminated its wide parity clause and detached the link between its prices and prices on other PCWs, offline and on selected hotel channels, it reestablished the link between the commission level imposed by Booking.com and the volume in demand:
In fact, accommodations will have the possibility of offering more attractive prices and better availability to competing OTAs of Booking.com which offer lower commission rates, which would thus enable the latter to increase the volume of their reservations and thus increase their market share… The hotels may thus transfer any increases in the commission rates charged by
Booking.com to the rate levels granted to the latter, without the obligation of also increasing the rates throughout the direct channel. Alternatively, the hotels may reduce the number of rooms made available on Booking.com in response to an increase in its commission rates.
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In line with the above, the Italian Competition Authority noted in its commitment decision that:
The removal of the hotels' obligation to offer to Booking rates and conditions that are equal or more favourable than those offered to competing OTAs, will
give these platforms the opportunity to use the commissions as competitive leverage in order to obtain from partner hotels more favourable conditions to be offered to consumers. In its judgment, the Düsseldorf Higher Regional Court focused on the effects of the wide MFNs used by HRS, the way they deprived customers of the opportunity to obtain a more advantageous room price for the same hotel room on other sales channels, and their adverse effect on entry, commissions and price.
82 Importantly, however, the Court's judgment made no comment regarding narrow MFNs, nor conducted substantive analysis of their effects. The
Court accepted the Bundeskartellamt's rejection of HRS's commitment to remove the wide parity clause for a five-year period, raising doubts as to the temporary nature of the commitment 83 and HRS's possible recalcitrance. 84 The Bundeskartellamt considered that only a prohibition order would suffice to ensure that the MFN clauses were eliminated and to guarantee legal certainty for HRS's contracting partners. On appeal, the Court endorsed the decision and held that the precedent-setting effect of an infringement decision was extremely important in this case: (1) and (2) As noted by Commissioner Vestager, the Booking.com cases have been a "learning experience" and a "very good example" of how greater coordination is needed.
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VII. The Adequate Level of Intervention
The balancing exercise between the competitive promise of online MFNs, on the one hand, and their anti-competitive effects, on the other, reflects the complexity of two-sided markets and the enforcers' attempts to minimise restrictions to those necessary for PCWs' operation. As illustrated above, the analysis of both wide and narrow parity is context dependant. These provisions may include a number of restrictions, not all price related, and they differ in scope and effect.
Overall, the distinction between wide and narrow parity reflects two opposing ends of the spectrum. While the use of wide MFNs has largely been viewed as overly restrictive of competition, the use of narrow MFNs provides for a more balanced effect.
As illustrated above, narrow MFNs facilitate investment by PCWs in services and demandenhancing features, while simultaneously protecting them from direct free-riding by the supplier. The presence of the intermediary -the PWC -offers welfare enhancing services for customers, as well as efficiencies and risk mitigation for suppliers. In addition, it facilitates the entry of new suppliers, and enhances both inter-and intra-brand competition.
On a case by case analysis, the competition agency would explore the market dynamics and the possible effects generated by narrow MFNs and PCWs. From a legal perspective, that analysis may be conducted using three distinct analytical approaches. that the restrictions put forward by the narrow MFN are indispensable to attain these 91 This is so, as by their nature, narrow parity clauses do not constitutes a restriction of competition by object. See for instance: Case C-67/13 P Groupement des cartes bancaires v European Commission, where the Court of Justice held that: 'The concept of restriction of competition 'by object' can be applied only to certain types of coordination between undertakings which reveal a sufficient degree of harm to competition …' (para 58) 92 The assessment under Article 101(3) TFEU requires prior determination of the restrictive nature and impact of the clause. See: Guidelines on the application of Article 101(3) TFEU, OJ C 101, 27.4.2004, p. 97-118 efficiencies; (c) that the efficiency gains are passed to consumers; and (d) that competition in respect of a substantial part of the products in question in not eliminated.
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A Third analytical approach may utilise the ancillary restraint doctrine developed in case law.
Accordingly, narrow parity may be viewed as ancillary to the agreement between the PCW and the supplier: a restriction without which the benefits provided by the online platform would not materialise (due to the fact, for example, that investment downstream would be undermined). 94 The assessment of ancillary restraints is limited to determining whether, in the context of the main non-restrictive activity -i.e. the promotion of the supplier's product or service -a particular restriction is necessary for the implementation of that activity and proportionate to it. 95 Accordingly, a restriction imposed by a narrow MFN will not be caught by Article 101 TFEU when it is limited to what is necessary to ensure the delivery of the services offered by the web-aggregator to the supplier.
As the nature of an effects based analysis is its context dependency, no absolute statement can be made as to the legality of narrow MFNs. Still, with this caveat in mind, recent investigations and commitment decisions suggest that the restrictions afforded by narrow parity facilitate competition dynamics and are welfare enhancing.
VIII. State Intervention
Having discussed the adequate scope of competition law intervention, one should be mindful of other enforcement tools at the disposal of the State. A State may favour other enforcement or regulatory vehicles over competition law when dealing with distinct industries or markets. 96 Political, social, industrial and economic interests -which are external to competition analysis -may play a role in some industries, leading to varying levels of intervention. While such an approach may well have limited grounding in competition analysis, it may reflect a legitimate political or social agenda.
Importantly, state intervention through legislation or regulation should not be confused with competition law analysis. In fact, it is often the case that 'external' intervention is called for exactly in instances in which the competition analysis reveals no harm and yet the State is concerned with wider consequences. 97 Such may be the case, for instance, when competition law intervention is not triggered because overall consumer welfare is enhanced, yet the state is concerned with the distribution of welfare, an imbalance in bargaining power or other social goals which trigger non-competition intervention.
An illuminating example in the context of parity clauses was recently provided by the French legislator's ban on all MFNs in the French hotel sector. 98 In July 2015, the French National
Assembly approved a ban on all rate parity clauses in contracts between PCWs and hotels.
The legislation secures the freedom of hotels to set lower prices both online and offline, and The European hotel industry sees this decision as a key milestone to restore complete entrepreneurial freedom for hoteliers all across Europe. After Germany which banned parity clauses in a competition case, followed by a Court judgment, France is opening a potential new way forward through the legislative process.
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The absolute ban is of great intellectual interest, as the suggested aim of the legislation was to ameliorate the position of hoteliers and their customers in France. As such, the ban does not seek to advance an external unrelated interest, but rather a similar agenda to that considered in detail by the French competition authority. This overlap in aim is striking. While the legislator has the power to advance and promote a range of policies, not all consistent with competition law, in this particular legislation, it seemed to engage with the aim of remedying competition on the market and favouring its own balancing point over that endorsed by the competition agency. On the other hand, it is worth noting that the ban has been applied selectively, only to the hotel sector and not to other industries. Such selective application suggests a limited competition rationale and the promotion of narrow interests, by selected stockholders. And what may be the competitive cost? These could possibly be found in the French Competition agency's analysis which permitted narrow MFNs. The risk of free-riding may lead to subsequent reduced investment downstream, to reduced conversion rates and an increase in costs for information and search. Further, the ban may increase barriers to entry 100 http://www.hotrec.eu/newsroom/press-releases-1714/france-forbids-rate-parity-clauses-by-law-anothercrucial-step-for-hotels-in-europe-to-regain-control-over-their-offer.aspx. 101 Id. 102 From a competition perspective, it is important to note that, at present, narrow MFNs in industries outside the hotel sector in France remain permissible subject to an effects based analyses. and expansion for small and medium size hotels. These entities are likely to have difficulties coping with the risks and costs associated with direct advertising and sales. If indeed so, the upstream market may witness an increase in the market power of larger business which would benefit from reduced competitive pressure. In such case, the changing market dynamics are likely to be welfare reducing.
IX. Concluding remarks
Parity clauses provide us with an illustration of the complex balancing exercises that competition enforcers engage in. On the one hand, these clauses enable welfare enhancing investment and innovation downstream, which benefit customers and suppliers. On the other, they may lead to a restriction of competition through excessive intermediation and price uniformity and they may also limit low cost entry.
Two distinguishable strands of parity -narrow and wide MFNs -lead to different effects. As illustrated, unlike wide parity, narrow parity has been largely found to provide an adequate balancing formula -limiting externalities and facilitating investment downstream.
Naturally, the analysis is fact intensive and dependent on the market context. Different market realities and different agreements may yield ranging effects. Importantly, however, a blank refusal to consider the role played by narrow MFNs may cut too deep into the competitive process and harm both suppliers and customers.
A detailed market oriented analysis has to weigh the risks of externalities and free riding and the way these may affect the dynamics of competition and investment. It has to consider the benefits afforded by PCWs and the role they play as intermediaries -facilitating entry and competition. In that respect, the imposition of an absolute ban as put forward by French legislation is worrying. To the extent that it aimed to protect consumers and competition, it might have indeed missed its target. After all, as unfortunate as it may be, externalities are not costless, even when endorsed by the State.
